Abstract -In thermal hydraulics design and safety analysis of the HTR-PM
I. INTRODUCTION
A unique feature of HTGRs is the very high temperature of the circulating helium-over 700℃. Such helium can be used directly inside a gas turbine to drive an electrical generator, thus eliminating the need for an intermediate steam cycle. Besides producing electricity, HTGRs can provide hightemperature heat required in many chemical processes, such as the gasification of coal and desalination of sea water. Thus, the HTGRs play an important role in GEN IV reactors.
Since Lohnert and Reutler proposed the concept of modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR-Modul) in the end of the 1970s, various countries have put a lot of attention on development of MHTGR for its high inherent safety and excellent future of the utility with high temperature gas [2] . Several test reactors of various power levels have been constructed in the last 30 years, such as AVR and THTR-300 in Germany, the Peach Bottome HTGR and the Fort St. Vrain HTGR in U.S., etc. Up to now, only the HTTR (30MW thermal) in Japan, and HTR-10 (the 10MW High Temperature gascooled test Reactor) in China are running as test reactors, while other earlier HTGRs have been shut down for years. China is designing and constructing their commercial demonstrated HTR plant--High Temperature gas-cooled Reactor-Pebble-bed Module (HTR-PM) now.
The HTR-10 was the first test HTR constructed according to the principles of the HTR-Modul in the world, which was designed, constructed and operated by Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology (INET) of Tsinghua University. In fact the construction of the HTR-10 started in June 1995. In December of 2000, the HTR-10 reached a criticality for the first time and in January of 2003 it achieved the full power operating with a thermal power output of 10 MW and a coolant outlet temperature of 700℃ [3] . As time goes on, many planned commissioning tests have performed on the HTR-10 to test the performance of sphere fuel elements and to demonstrate its passive safety characteristic, etc. The designing codes used for HTR-10, such as THERMIX, were also validated by the test results at the same time [4, 5, 6.] .
Soon after that, the project of the HTR-10 with a gas turbine cycle, which was later named HTR-10GT, was set up at the second phased of the China High Technology Program in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The INET and the OKBM (Russia) signed a contract to start the conceptual design of the power conversion unit (PCU) with a direct gas-turbine cycle for the HTR-10 at the end of 2000. It was jointly completed in 2002. The basic design was completed by the INET in 2003. Many analysis on safety of the HTR10-GT had been done.
The HTR demonstration plant-pebble bed modular (HTR-PM) began to construct in November 2012, since the Fukushima accident delayed the approval of the China's administration authorities. The technical scheme of HTR-PM adopts twomodule reactor of 2 × 250 MWth with one-zone cylindrical core, which has sufficiently considered the actual nuclear industrial manufacturing capability and engineering feasibility for the reactor pressure vessel, the main helium blower, as well as the physical requirements including the reflector rod worth for different power levels, removal of the decay heat by passive mechanisms, and so on.
The thermal hydraulic design and analysis on HTR-PM was completed with THERMIX and TINTE, which were induced from Germany, due to their experiences on AVR and THTR-300, and later re-developed in INET. However, the thermal hydraulic codes of THERMIX could only simulate the behavior of the primary loop and the second loop, which was sufficient to fulfill the assessment requirement. The phenomena in the containment could not be analyzed by THERMIX code directly and other codes, such as RETRAN and FLUENT were used to study the conditions in the containment. To get an accurate simulation result, the paper tried to set up a complete model of the primary loop, the second loop and the containment of HTR-PM, with RELAP5/SCDAPSIM/MOD4 code.
The RELAP/SCDAPSIM code, designed to predict the behavior of reactor systems during normal and accident conditions, is being developed as part of the international SCDAP Development and Training Program (SDTP) [7] . The most advanced production version, MOD3.4, is also used for general user training and for the design and analysis of severe accident related experiments such as those performed in the Phebus and Quench facilities. In turn, these experiments are used to improve the detailed fuel behavior and other severe accidentrelated models in MOD3.4 and MOD4.0. MOD4.0 is currently available only to program members and is used primarily to develop advanced modelling options and to support graduate research programs and training.
After comparing the calculating results of loss of coolant due to a large line break, the paper studied the consequences of a small break occurring in the instrument room and a large break in the pressure release room of the HTR-PM by using RELAP5/MOD4.0.
II. THE MODEL OF HTR-PM
Supported by the National Technology Research and Development Program and domestic industrial companies, the 200 MWe High Temperature gascooled Reactor Pebble-be Module was designed by INET to develop a commercial scale reactor. The HTR-PM is scheduled to operate in the end of 2017. During the processing of construction, the large power level HTR technology with inherent safety features would be verified and validated. The HTR-PM consists of 2 ×250 MWth twomodule reactor, which has a one-zone cylindrical pebble-bed core, and one steam-driven turbine, and the primary loop can be seen in Fig. 1 .
II.A. Description of the HTR-PM
One module of the HTR-PM composes of one reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and one steam generator pressure vessel (SGPV), which are connected by one horizontal hot gas duct pressure vessel. RPV and SGPV are placed side by side in concrete cavities. The fuel element in the HTR-PM are similar with the HTR-10. The height of the core packed bed is about 11 m and there are total 420,000 spherical fuel elements in the active core region. The designed burn-up of fuel elements will reach a value of 100 GWd/tU, after 15 times passing through the core. Proved by the experiments in Germany, the fission product released in an accident can be effectively retained in the spheres if the temperature was below 1600℃.
The main helium blower, which is vertically installed in the top of the SGPV, pumps the cold helium of an average temperature of 250℃ to enter the RPV, and pass the outer annular channel of the coaxial duct. Then the helium flows downwards along the helium channel between the core vessel and the RPV shell, and enters the bottom of the reactor, then passes the steel support component and 94% of the helium reaches the top of the core, after passing through 30 coolant borehole located in the side reflectors. After that, the helium flowing direction turns and the core would heat up the main helium flow, while other part flows down along the control rod guide tube channels in the side reflectors. The helium got an average temperature of 750 ℃ after sufficiently mixing in the bottom plenum. Then it flows in the central tube of the coaxial duct and enter the SGPV, passes the heat exchange tubes of "U-pattern" and return to the helium blowers and complete the coolant cycle. There are large and small lines, such as pressure measuring pipe and releasing pipe, connected to SGPV near the blowers.
Normally, in the Primary Safety Analysis Report, attention was focused on the behavior of the primary loop and the reactor core. The maximum fuel temperature was a very important parameter during an accident to ensure a limited radioactivity release.
Proceedings of the HTR 2014 Weihai, China, October 27-31, 2014
Paper HTR2014-61155
And the safety analysis assured that the reactor was safe during a design basis accident. But, for a newdesigned reactor, all the equipment in the containment should be able to fulfill its desired function under all conditions. So the conditions of rooms inside the containment are also very important for purchase and distributions of the system equipment.
II.B. the RELAP5 model
THEMIX code was able to simulate the behavior of the core and the primary loop components. But it is hard to calculate the conditions in the containment. The code output could provide energy and mass sources entering the containment. If we use CFD programs to calculate the phenomena inside the containment, the mesh size would be too immense to perform on personal computers. The purpose of the paper was to analyze the behavior of helium in the containment when a line break happened in the primary loop, with a thermal hydraulic code.
A detailed model of HTR-PM reactor building was developed. It includes the reactor, the primary loop, the secondary loop and the containment, which can be seen in Fig. 2 . Each thermal hydraulic component has a 3-digit number, and the first loop components were started with 1 and the secondary loop with 2.
The pebble-bed core of the HTR-PM was modeled with seven pipes and each has ten axial nodes, attached with heat structures to produce heat. The guide tubes for control rod and small absorberballs were also modeled by "pipe" component. Pipe 321, 322, 323, 324 were used to model the helium at static state inside the reactor pressure vessel. Inside the steam generator of the secondary loop, the U-pattern tube exchanger was simulated by heat structure 1401. The reactor pressure vessel, the steam generator vessel and the hot gas duct pressure vessel were modeled by heat structures, too. The heat transfer between the pressure vessel and the containment wall was simulated by heat conduction with an equivalent heat transfer coefficient, which take into account heat conduction and convection in air and radiation inside the containment. As the paper focuses on the helium behavior in the containment, the key parameter was the helium temperature in the core after a line break happened and the reactor scrammed. Fig.3 shows the core helium temperature during a line break accident calculated by RELAP5. The plot in Fig.4 predicted the peak fuel temperature at a small line break accident simulated by THERMIX code system. In normal operating, the fuel temperature peak occurs at the bottom of the core and it is about 100℃ higher than the coolant passing the fuel elements. During accidents after scramming and formation of natural circulation of the cooling gas, the temperature difference between the cooling gas and the center of the fuel element is nearly 10℃. Comparing Fig.3&4 , we could find that the temperatures agree well between RELAP5 and THERMIX calculation results.
II.C. The line break accident
A line break accident was a DBA of the HTR-PM and the diameter of the break should be no more than 65 mm, which might occur on lines such as the fuel elements circulating lines, the helium line connected to relief valves, measurement instruments, and purification system lines, etc. The break may occur at anywhere of the primary loop pressure boundary.
This study put attention on a small break occurred in the instrument-room located nearby the steam generator cavity and a large break in the pressure relief room.
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There are four instrument-rooms to measure temperature and pressure, shared by the two HTR-PM modules and they are connected by one set of air conditioning and ventilation filtration system. There is also one bursting disc connected one of the four instrument-rooms to the ambient atmosphere, and its setting value is 1.3 bar.
If a small break occurred in one instrument-room, it is supposed that the cold helium sprayed out of the break came from the steam generator and has already been cooled through the U-pattern tube by the secondary side feed-water. Though the line diameter is 10 mm, there is a throat with a diameter of 6 mm at the steam generator pressure vessel inside the pipe. As the system pressure drops and the helium temperature at the core outlet increases, the protection system receives scram signals and began to shut down the reactor and isolate the primary loop. There are two isolating valves in the instrumentroom near the cavity wall for each line. If the break occurred between the wall and the first isolating valve in the instrument-room, the break cannot be isolated and the helium in the primary loop would be released totally until a pressure balance between the primary loop and the containment atmosphere. Otherwise the break could be isolated once the protection signals were detected and then scramming actions would be taken. The accident consequence of other break locations after the valves was covered by the first scenario.
The cold helium from the steam generator at a temperature of 250 ℃ could drop to 120 ℃ once jetted out at a critical speed. It was estimated that the room temperature was around 120 ℃ when the blower flap closed following the scram signal. If the blower flow path remained open, the room temperature would increase at the later phase of the helium releasing.
The second case studied in the paper was a large line break occurred in the pressure-relief room. The pressure releasing system and the helium auxiliary system share one pipe with a diameter of 65 mm which penetrates the SGPV cavity and connect to the SGPV wall. There are two isolating valves in the pressure-relief room and another bursting disc connecting to the environment. If the large break occurred just near the cavity wall, the isolating valves would fail to work and the first loop could not be isolated. The helium in the primary loop would release into the pressure-relief room and lead to a high pressure in the room, which would break the bursting disc and induce cooling gas entering the environment. In a very short time, the reactor pressure and the atmosphere would reach a balance. This accident consequence could bound other cases induced by breaks happened on the primary loop pressure boundary except the fuel recirculating system lines.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
The pressure measuring lines locate in the instrument rooms connected to the primary loop pressure boundary with a diameter of 10 mm at the stream generation pressure vessel near the blower inlet, where the helium is at a temperature of 250 ℃. When the break occurred, the cold helium would be jetted out through a throat with a diameter of 6 mm, at a critical speed of the cooling gas, which would decrease its temperature to 120 ℃ . So the air temperature in the instrument would reach 120 ℃ soon. In about an hour, the second scram signal was detected and the reactor protection system took actions to scram the reactor, such as closing the isolating valves of the primary loop, shutting down the blower, turning off the blow flap, dropping the control rods. (The first scram signal was skipped as usual in safety analysis).
If the break located before the primary loop isolating valve, then the primary loop could not be isolated completely, and the helium released continuously through the break. But the scram function was not affected. With the decreasing of the primary system pressure, the flow rate through the break dropped. Because of the existence of the throat with a diameter of 6 mm the actual flow mass rate of helium released was very small. The helium was sprayed in a critical flow speed until 3 hours later and the helium temperature flowing out of the break was near 120 ℃. Fig. 4 shows the helium flow rate through the break during the accident. The temperature of the instrument room where the break happened was plotted in Fig. 5 . The first temperature peak appeared when the bursting disc opened as its setting pressure reached, which can be seen in Fig.6 . The room temperature first reached a peak before the bursting disc broke and then dropped to 120 ℃ , which would be then kept unchanged for hours. The flow rate change at 3000 s resulted from the shutdown actions. If the break happened after the isolating valve, the isolating of the primary loop would be completed and the system stayed in high pressure. The room temperature would increase to 120 ℃ rapidly once the break started to release helium. The room pressure exceeded the bursting disc setting value soon and the disc opened. After that the room restored to normal pressure. After the success isolating, there was no helium added to the instrument room and the room temperature decreased slowly due to the heat conduction to the room wall. The pressure releasing line is installed in the pressure-relief room, which has a connection to the primary loop pressure boundary with a diameter of 65 mm at the stream generation pressure vessel near the blower inlet. When the large break occurred, the cold helium would be ejected out at a critical speed of helium, and its temperature would decrease to 120 ℃. So the air temperature of the pressure-relief room would rise to 120℃ very soon and the bursting disc would break quickly. In one minute, the second scram signal was detected and the reactor protection system took actions to shutdown the reactor.
If the break located before the primary loop isolating valve, then the primary loop could not be isolated completely, and the helium released continuously through the break in 20 minutes. But the scram function was not affected. With the decreasing of the primary system pressure, the mass flow rate through the break dropped quickly. Fig. 7 shows the helium flow rate through the break during the accident. The temperature of the pressure-relief room was given in Fig. 8 . Fig.9 plotted the room temperature during the helium releasing. When the bursting disc opened as its setting pressure achieved, the room temperature first reached a peak and then dropped. In a very short time the helium temperature began to rise because the water in the second side of SG dried out and the helium passing the core outlet could not be cooled enough. When the pressure balance reached, the room temperature rose to about 200℃. Thus the temperature of the hot gas dropped because of natural circulation and heat conduction to the building wall. If the break occurred after the isolating valve, the isolating of the primary loop would be completed and the system stayed in high pressure. The room temperature would increase to 120 ℃ rapidly once the break started to release helium. The room pressure exceed the bursting disc setting value in 1 minute and the disc opened. Then the room restored to normal pressure. After the success isolating, there is no more helium released to the pressure-relief room and the room temperature decreased slowly due to the heat conduction to the room wall.
Except the line break of fuel elements circulating pipe and absorber balls pipes, other helium lines connected with the primary loop would not lead to a more serious consequence once a break occurred.
When the blower flap opened for some reasons after the scram measures finished, the helium temperature through the break would increase because part of the hot gas in the core would be jetted out without the cooling of the steam generator. This type of cases should be analyzed carefully if the probability of flap opening is large enough.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A RELAP5 model of HTR-PM was developed and validated by comparing calculating results from DBA accidents analysis tools. It was used to simulate the break accidents happened in the instrument room and the pressure-relief room.
The small break would lead to a duration of helium releasing for a long time, but the instrument room temperature did not change very much at the later phase. Due to the helium released from the primary loop, the instrument room temperature would exceed 120 ℃ in the early phase before the broke of the bursting disc. Once a break is detected, the protection system would take measures to scram the reactor. If the reactor shutting down system worked normally after break, the passive residual heat system would bring out the decay heat and there would be no safety threaten. As the instruments could bear 130 ℃ for hours, the small break would not lead to serious consequences or effect on the reactor scram, whether the small break isolated or not. Only the monitoring function at the early stage of the accident should be noted.
When a large break occurred, the helium releasing time was much shorter. In 1 minute, the protection system would shut down the reactor after two scram signals. In 5 minutes, the valve driving function would run normally, while the room temperature did not exceed 130 ℃ . Once the isolating function finished, no more actions were needed and the room temperature would decrease by natural circulating and heat conduction to the building wall. Even if the break could not be isolated, there would not be threaten to the scram function. It is considered that there is no threaten to the valves in the 5 minutes and the monitoring function at the accident should be noticed.
